The last thing Israel needs is Ehud Barak in a leadership role

(Ed.note: yep, copy that. But in all fairness, he plays a helluva classical piano.)

by Dr. Aaron Lerner

Ehud Barak was clueless on strategic matters and careless in decision making.

The last thing Israel needs is a return of Ehud Barak to a leadership position.

Here are just a few examples of his past failures:

#1. Barak clueless of need for subs or second strike capability:

Excerpts from “A strategic navy in a nuclear Middle East” By Reuven Pedatzur – Ha’aretz 5 November 2000 (written when Israel took delivery of the last of the first three German made submarines specially fitted with launch tubes that could accommodate Jericho missiles)

But the story behind the submarine project is to a large extent cause for concern. On the eve of the Gulf War, a decision to scuttle the project was taken at the IDF General Staff: that is, to leave the navy without any submarines at all. Only the stricken conscience of Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor, after the extent of German aid to the Iraqis became known, led to the decision to fund the submarines. Thus, it was German money that saved the submarine project.

The General Staff’s decision is cause for concern because all those who took part in the discussion knew very well, based on intelligence estimates, that within a small number of years Israel would be threatened by nuclear weapons. It is difficult to fathom how those who are supposed to be familiar with and to understand strategic thinking in the modern era decided to give up the strategic potential inherent in submarines. There is no alternative but to question the judgment of the top brass, and this question deserves an answer. It is an interesting fact that the person who led the opposition to building the submarines in that discussion, and the person whose position prevailed in the end, was none other than the person who served at the time as deputy chief of staff, Ehud Barak.

#2. Gaza Coast Drilling Right Debacle: The 1993 Oslo accords assigned the Palestinians a 20-by-20-mile swath of sea for limited ”fishing, recreation, and economic activity,” but said nothing about resources beneath the Mediterranean. As prime minister, Ehud Barak unilaterally and without the receipt of any Palestinian concessions, effectively handed over exploitation rights for the Gaza coastal area to the Palestinian Authority, with the British BG Group signing an agreement with the PA on natural gas development off Gaza.

#3. Barak clueless of consequences of South Lebanon Retreat: It would be bad enough that Ehud Barak’s hasty 2000 retreat was a planning fiasco with no provisions for the allied SLA forces and heavy weapons and other military equipment abandoned in Lebanon. More critical is that Barak failed to back up his warning that Israel would have zero tolerance for any cross border violations from Lebanon in the wake of the retreat. Barak responded to the daily rock throwing and periodic fire bomb throwing by quipping that “a stone throne at a farmer in Metulah or a soldier does not justify a sharp response by the IDF that might heat up the area again.” (YNET – 11 August, 2000) which was followed by more serious attacks that also failed to get a serious response.

But that’s not the biggest problem with the retreat.

The top problem is that after the retreat Ehud Barak continues to confuse Hezbollah PATIENCE with Israeli DETERRENCE.

Hezbollah has patiently built up its first strike capability, now possessing over a hundred thousand rockets.

And now Hezbollah is patiently upgrading its missiles by attaching guidance kits flown into Beirut Airport.

Again: this is Hezbollah PATIENCE not to attack until it is ready – not Israeli DETERRENCE.

And this is critical to understand because this confusion can drive to dangerously wrong policy decisions.