To Negotiate Or Not To Negotiate?

By Shaun Meller

The recent flap over the Likud Knesset elections, and the relative success Moshe Feiglin had in contributing to the outcome has elicited some interesting reactions in mainstream media. Feiglin merited a full three paragraphs, I believe for the first time, in the New York Times. The Jewish Week had an air of panic quoting Social Welfare Minister Yitzhak Herzog, “The State of Israel will be under the spell of a very extreme group.” The most interesting juxtaposition in the same article, however, came from the following: Gerald Steinberg, a political science professor at Bar-Ilan University is “confident that Feiglin [would] have no role in Netanyahu’s government and that he would be isolated,” followed by, “Feiglin would likely ‘embarrass Netanyahu, the party and the country on the world stage’” by Meir Javedanfar, a Tel-Aviv based Middle East analyst. The article goes on to talk about the various machinations Netanyahu would have to take in order to accomplish negotiations with the Palestinians. What fascinates me is how the media attempts to figure out what Netanyahu will need to do to follow the negotiating path of his predecessors from Kadima and Labor, and therein lies the rub.

Let’s take a voyage of common sense together, shall we? I know it can be a stretch for many in Israel to embark on such a voyage, but there’s always a first. Imagine, for a moment, that here in the present, we are sitting at a crossroads of trains called Grand Central Terminal. The past 60+ years have led us here, and more specifically, the developments of the last 17 years (since 1991, The Madrid Conference, at which Netanyahu participated).

What voters should be able to decide in the national elections coming up in February is the course the country will chart, with the most pressing issue being the weighty “peace process.” The train that Israel has been on has been called many things, “Oslo I”, “Oslo II”, “The Wye Accords”, “The Road Map”, etc. This analogy does not solely belong to me. Boogie Ya’alon has made a similar analogy, stating that some Prime Ministers have attempted to move further back on the train, but allowed the train to continue on its path nevertheless. While we sit here at Grand Central Terminal, waiting to catch the next train out of the station, that train should be taking the country in one of two possible directions, as far as I can see it - MORE negotiations or NO MORE negotiations. All options and additional concerns flow from this key question. Approaches such as unilateral withdrawal (alternatively known as “surrender”, “capitulation”, “evacuation”, “disengagement”), have proven to be tactics, but still leave the question of negotiations to be answered.

If the answer the country decides is yes – we must negotiate, then the logical flow of questions that follows would be something along the lines of (1) with whom – the Palestinian Authority or Hamas or both? (2) are the heads of the PA or Hamas credible negotiating partners? (3) what are the “red lines,” or fallback negotiating positions (if any) Israel is prepared to establish? (4) what should be the timeline? (5) what will happen with parties left out of the negotiations (such as the Israeli Arabs, the Syrians, Lebanese, Hezbollah, etc) (6) Should the international community continue to be involved, and if so, whom and how much involvement should there be? (7) Should the international community commit military forces to impose a solution?

If the answer the country decides is no – we must no longer negotiate, then the logical flow of questions that follows would be something like (1) what are the alternative tactics that do not require direct interface with the Palestinians? (2) if we choose a military alternative, what are Israel’s options vis-à-vis the PA/Hamas? (3) how about versus Hezbollah, Iranian, Syrian or other intervention? (4) is Israel prepared to accept loss of life on the part of soldiers and civilians, and if so, what is the expected loss? (5) is Israel prepared to face significant vilification and possible repercussions in the international community? (6) can the Arabs, in fact, be deported? (7) what are the legal ramifications of this? (8) will the Palestinians accept compensation to leave? (9) will they be able to leave if such compensation could be arranged? (10) who would take them in?

There are, of course, many more questions that can be asked for both scenarios, but the idea is that these are the two overarching positions that can be adopted by Israel’s government. Now here’s the problem: do the voters in Israel have the ability to elect a government that will pursue EITHER of these options? If your answer is yes, because they can vote for the new Hatikva party to be headed by Aryeh Eldad, or the National Religious Party/National Union party, then you clearly don’t understand the question. These parties will have the possibility of influencing the government by throwing their handful of mandates into the government, but will not be deciding government policy. If your answer is yes because you favor negotiations, then you clearly DO understand the current state of affairs in the Banana Republic of Israel.

Israelis who want the country to halt negotiations have no place to turn. The Likud, were Netanyahu to adhere faithfully to its charter, should be the logical party of the right, as represented by those no longer interested in negotiations. Israelis who consider themselves to be “moderate” should, theoretically, be able to decide to alter course between these two options, and pursue a direction that is more conservative (you can read this as “militaristic”, “offensive”, etc.). Voters chose that course with Ariel Sharon when he ran against Amram Mitzna. In the largest landslide in Israeli electoral history, Sharon defeated Mitzna when the then-head of Labor’s sole platform position was – disengagement and building a fence around Judea and Samaria. Shockingly, the voters were shown just how meaningless their votes were when Sharon pursued Mitzna’s course after the election and fired 2 ministers to push through the disengagement after losing a procedural and non-binding Likud referendum to make it happen.

Would you, dear logical readers, consider this to be the will of the people? Would you consider this to be democracy at work? Did Sharon violate the law in doing what he did? – no. Did Netanyahu crown himself king and eliminate the internal Likud procedures that allowed him to push Feiglin down on the list, and eliminate Shmuel Sackett, who received 10 times more votes than someone who is now occupying Moshe’s former spot on the list? – no. Does that mean that democracy is alive and well in Israel, or does it mean that the system is woefully broken and desperately needs to be fixed?

Many ask why Feiglin doesn’t just start his own party. For what purpose – to be relegated to an alternative to Aryeh Eldad? There are those who question Feiglin’s decision to try to get a position in the Likud in the first place if the very system in which do it is stacked against him. I would simply ask, is there another way? There are those who believe Feiglin should be appealing to the highest court in the land to reverse Netanyahu’s victory in the Likud court. If Netanyahu simply played the system he knows well (and mentored under the most astute player of the game, Ariel Sharon) to his advantage, what would be the point?

So what’s the answer? Feiglin has scratched the surface of an old patchwork of Ottoman and British rules, combined with crafty Israeli inventions. The only chance he has…the only chance the country has…for any real change, is for Feiglin to keep pushing, and by gathering enough strength with numbers, to slowly but surely break through. Time is on his side, and I believe the sheer clarity of a near totalitarian system that the Likud voters, at a minimum, are living under, will eventually force the change from within. Then, when he’s the one occupying the number one spot on the Likud slate, the Israeli voters can choose….to negotiate, or not to negotiate.